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ABSTRACT
A Pilot Program to “encourage enhancement of expertise” in patent cases among district judges
recently got underway in the federal courts. The program is designed to funnel patent cases to
judges who volunteer to become “pilot judges.” The idea is that as these judges hear more patent
cases and become more familiar with patent law, they will be able to craft claim constructions and
opinions that are increasingly likely to survive the scrutiny of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence may itself encumber these efforts
because of a split among the Federal Circuit judges concerning the correct approach to interpreting
patent claims. This Article explores that split and its potential to undermine the pilot judges’ efforts
to make the program a success.
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ON MEASURING THE EXPERTISE OF PATENT-PILOT JUDGES:
ENCOURAGING ENHANCEMENT OF CLAIM-CONSTRUCTION UNIFORMITY
ETAN S. CHATLYNNE*
INTRODUCTION
A Pilot Program to “encourage enhancement of expertise” in patent cases among
the federal judiciary1 recently commenced in United States district courts. 2 One
important goal of the Pilot Program is to increase efficiency in patent litigation by
reducing the reversal rate of district judges’ patent claim constructions.3 The
program’s structure resembles a scientific experiment whereby claim-construction
reversal rates may be correlated with judicial expertise. 4 In other words, Congress
has hypothesized that increasing judicial experience with patent cases should cause a
drop in claim-construction reversal rates.5
Unfortunately, testing the hypothesis may prove difficult. Beyond the general
vagaries of litigation, enhancing judicial expertise in patent law may not necessarily
cause a meaningful decrease in the reversal rate of claim constructions. 6 One
obstacle to reducing the reversal rate is that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit seems to have “developed two distinct approaches to claim
construction, and utilize[s these approaches] interchangeably.”7 Because cases are
assigned to Federal Circuit judges after all appeal briefs have been filed, 8 even the
most experienced district judges are left to guess which of these two approaches the
* © Etan S. Chatlynne 2013. Etan Chatlynne is an Associate at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan
LLP. The author thanks Matthew Siegal for his support and advice. Views expressed in this article
are not necessarily the views of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan or its clients.
1 Patent Pilot Program Act, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).
2 See District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program, U.S. CTS. (June 7, 2011), http://www
.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx.
3 See Patent Pilot Program Act § 1(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 3675–76.
4 See id.
5 See 156 CONG. REC. H8537 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe) (“The
premise underlying H.R. 628 is, succinctly stated, practice makes perfect, or at least better. Judges
who focus more attention on patent cases will be expected to be better prepared to make decisions
that can withstand appellate scrutiny.”).
6 See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 261–62 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Courting
Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before
Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699,
1731–32 (2009) (“[T]o the extent that the Patent Pilot Program is designed to reduce claim
construction errors, it appears unlikely on its own to be effective.”).
7 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of
the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW (S. Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909028; accord Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for
rehearing en banc) (explaining that the Federal Circuit’s rules are “inconsistently applied, even by
us”).
8 See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 11
(2008), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/IOPsMaster.pdf.
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Federal Circuit may apply on appeal. This potential source of uncertainty may
indicate that the Pilot Program could be an inaccurate tool for testing Congress’s
hypothesis that increasing judicial experience with patent cases will cause a drop in
reversal rates. However, if the uncertainty can be reduced, perhaps by the Supreme
Court determining that only one of the Federal Circuit’s two approaches is correct,
the Pilot Program may become a useful tool for testing the hypothesis.
I. PATENT CLAIMS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
By statute, every patent must contain a specification that ends with “one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”9 Many specifications explain the
invention by describing exemplary embodiments of the invention. And, many
specifications conclude with multiple claims that differ in scope and terminology.
Patent litigation occurs when a patent owner accuses a defendant, in court, of
infringing at least one patent claim. In turn, the accused infringer ordinarily denies
the infringement and argues that the asserted claims are invalid. In order to
determine who is right and who is wrong, the court typically must interpret several
claim terms having definitions that the parties dispute. This interpretive exercise is
known as claim construction.10
The Federal Circuit has explained that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given
their ordinary and customary meaning,’”11 which is “the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the
invention.”12 Critically, this hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art
understands the term in question “not only in the context of the particular claim in
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent.”13
In many patent cases, claim construction can be a dispositive issue because
winning turns on whether patent claims are infringed, and, usually, whether the
claims survive the likely validity challenge.14 To borrow a phrase from Judge Giles S.
Rich, one of the principal contributors of the 1952 Patent Act, “the name of the game
is the claim.”15
Despite its importance, claim interpretation is often unpredictable. 16 By various
measures, the Federal Circuit reverses district court claim constructions at a high

35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
11 Id. at 1312 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
12 Id. at 1313.
13 Id.
14 Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, (manuscript at 4).
15 Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American
Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
16 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc); Lauren Maida, Patent
Claim Construction: It’s Not a Pure Matter of Law, So Why Isn’t the Federal Circuit Giving the
District Courts the Deference They Deserve?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1790–93 (2009).
9

10
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rate,17 suggesting to some that the “claim game” has become a game of chance.
Indeed, the situation prompted Judge Ronald H. Whyte of the District Court for the
Northern District of California to quip that if “the reversal rate is as high as some
claim, the easiest thing to do is figure out what your decision is and then write the
opposite.”18
Congress took note. It determined that a potential cause of the problem may be
that district judges lack sufficient experience in patent cases to reach proper
results.19 Thus, Congress reasoned that increasing judicial expertise in patent cases
should enable judges to achieve better results and lower the rate at which the
Federal Circuit reverses their claim constructions.20 As a result, Congress created
the Pilot Program.
II. THE PILOT PROGRAM
The Pilot Program will be implemented over a ten-year period in fourteen pilot
courts across the country.21 Some of the pilot courts are district courts in which a
large number of patent cases are filed each year.22 Other pilot courts are district
courts that hear fewer patent cases, but that have signaled their desire to hear more
through the adoption of local rules specific to patents. 23 Judges in the pilot courts
may ask their chief judge to designate them as pilot judges.24 Judges not
participating in the program may decline to hear any patent cases assigned to
them.25 These cases are then reassigned to the pilot judges.26 By one count, there
were eighty-five pilot judges and sixteen pilot magistrate judges.27
In theory, as patent cases funnel to the pilot judges, these judges will hear more
patent cases, which will increase their familiarity with patent law, potentially
17 See Maida, supra note 16, at 1790 & n.115 (citing various studies that provide a cumulative
range of twenty-five to seventy-one percent reversal rate and that suggest the rate may be
increasing); 156 CONG. REC. H8537 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2010) (statement of Rep. Judy Chu) (“[T]he
reversal rate of district court decisions is high, hovering around 50 percent.”).
18 The Law, Technology and the Arts Symposium: The Past, Present and Future of the Federal
Circuit: A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV.671, 680 (2004).
19 See 156 CONG. REC. H8537 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2010) (statement of Rep. Judy Chu).
20 See id. (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe).
21 Patent Pilot Program Act, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(c), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675 (2011). The pilot
courts are the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of New York, the Western
District of Pennsylvania, the District of New Jersey, the District of Maryland, the Northern District
of Illinois, the Southern District of Florida, the District of Nevada, the Eastern District of Texas, the
Northern District of Texas, the Western District of Tennessee, the Central District of California, the
Northern District of California, and the Southern District of California. See District Courts Selected
for Patent Pilot Program, U.S. CTS. (June 7, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-0607/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx.
22 See Patent Pilot Program Act § 1(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 3674–75.
23 See id. § 1(b)(2)(A)(ii).
24 Id. § 1(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 3674.
25 Id. § 1(a)(1)(C).
26 Id. § 1(a)(1)(D).
27 See Steven Gray, The Designated Judges for the New Specialized Patent Pilot Program for
U.S. Courts, IP BASICS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://patentmyinvention.blogspot.com/2012/02/newspecialized-patent-pilot-program.html.
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resulting in higher quality opinions more likely to “withstand appellate scrutiny.”28
The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in consultation
with the chief judge of each of the pilot courts and the Director of the Federal
Judicial Center, will monitor the experiment and prepare progress reports for the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and its counterpart in
the Senate.29 Among other things, these reports will include an “analysis of the
extent to which the program has improved the efficiency of the courts” and
comparisons of the relative rates at which pilot judges and non-pilot judges are
reversed on the issues of claim construction and substantive patent law. 30
Implicit in the statute and the legislative history is the hypothesis that reversal
rates will decrease with increased judicial expertise, such that improvements in
judicial expertise may be assessed from corresponding reductions in reversal rates. 31
With respect to claim-construction reversals, testing the hypothesis may prove
difficult, in part because the Pilot Program’s design does not account for a divide
among Federal Circuit judges concerning the correct approach for interpreting
claims.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the en banc Federal Circuit explained that “the words
of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’”32 which “is
the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art.”33 In
clarifying the types of evidence a judge should rely on to determine what the meaning
would be to a person having ordinary skill in the art, the Federal Circuit explained
that intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims, specification, and prosecution history) should
generally be preferred over extrinsic evidence (e.g., dictionaries, encyclopedias, and
expert testimony).34 Nonetheless, since Phillips, a single approach for determining
how a judge should enter the hypothetical person’s frame of reference has not
emerged.35 Instead, some have concluded that the Federal Circuit has developed at
least “two distinct approaches to claim construction, and utilize[s these approaches]
interchangeably.”36

156 CONG. REC. H8537 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe).
Patent Pilot Program Act, Pub. L. No. 111-349, § 1(e)(1), 124 Stat. 3674, 3675–76 (2011).
30 Id. § 1(e)(1)(B), (C), 124 Stat. at 3675.
31 See 156 CONG. REC. H8537 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe).
32 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
33 Id. at 1313.
34 See id. at 1317.
35 See Harold C. Wegner, Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings:
The 20 Year Claim
Construction Debate, IP FRONTLINE (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx
?id=24829&deptid=7.
36 See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, (manuscript at 8).
28
29
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A. The Holistic and Procedural Approaches
Professors R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge refer to the two approaches as
“Procedural” and “Holistic.”37 Under the Procedural approach, judges give primary
“weight to the claim language (and the ordinary meaning thereof, often derived from
dictionaries).”38 Under the Holistic approach, patent claims are interpreted “via an
all-encompassing, open-ended reading of the claim language, patent disclosure,
prosecution history, relevant dictionaries, and on-point expert testimony.”39 These
definitions do not indicate whether intrinsic evidence should be favored over extrinsic
evidence.
Professors Wagner and Petherbridge have performed two empirical studies
concerning the rates at which the Federal Circuit judges apply the two approaches.
In the first study, conducted before Phillips, they concluded that the Federal Circuit
applied the Procedural and Holistic approaches interchangeably.40 In the second
study, they revisited the first study, but incorporated post-Phillips cases to
determine whether Phillips affected the rates at which the two approaches have been
applied.41 The professors explained that, because Phillips represented the Federal
Circuit’s “attempt[] to clarify the divergent methodological approaches,” that case
“provide[d] an excellent opportunity to observe the success—or lack thereof—of this
effort.”42 They concluded from their data that Phillips “has not yielded any
significant observable effects on the claim construction jurisprudence of the Federal
Circuit.”43 The professors found that this result was “puzzling” 44 because they
understood that Phillips “clearly suggests that the Holistic approach is likely to be
the better one.”45 One reason why their study may not have indicated observable
effects is because, as the professors concede, the language of Phillips is “open-ended”
and “allows both methodological approaches to exist.”46 That is, Phillips may not
have disfavored the Procedural approach at all. 47 Rather, it may have condoned both
approaches, while simply disfavoring the use of extrinsic evidence in both.
In Phillips, the issue was whether the claim term “baffles” could be interpreted
as including baffles oriented at right angles. 48 Parts II and III of the majority
opinion set forth the law of claim construction.49 Appearing rather Holistic in nature,
the majority explained that it is “entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting
claim construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the
meaning of the claims.”50 The majority borrowed much from Vitronics Corp. v.

Id. (manuscript at 7).
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (manuscript at 8).
41 Id. (manuscript at 13–14).
42 Id. (manuscript at 10).
43 Id. (manuscript at 23).
44 Id. (manuscript at 20).
45 Id. (manuscript at 9).
46 Id. (manuscript at 21).
47 Id.
48 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
49 Id. at 1311–24.
50 Id. at 1317.
37
38
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Conceptronic, Inc.,51 a panel opinion in which claim scope was “holistically” matched
to the specification’s disclosure.52 Quoting Vitronics, the majority explained that “the
specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it
is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”53 And
quoting Judge Rich, the majority further explained that the “descriptive part of the
specification aids in ascertaining the scope and meaning of the claims inasmuch as
the words of the claims must be based on the description. The specification is, thus,
the primary basis for construing the claims.”54
Based on this “holistic” language, and because the “specification ma[de] clear
that the ‘baffles’ in this invention are angled,”55 a first-time reader of Phillips may
have been inclined to expect that the “baffles” in the claims should exclude baffles
oriented at right angles. If so, this reader would likely have been surprised by Part
IV, where the majority concluded that the term “baffles” included baffles oriented at
right angles.56 To reach this conclusion, the majority engaged in a technique known
as “claim differentiation.”57 “Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, ‘each claim
in a patent is presumptively different in scope.’”58 The doctrine is most often applied
in “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation [to] give[] rise
to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent
claim.”59 Independent claim 1 did not specify the orientation of the claimed
“baffles.”60 However, because the dependent claims did specify orientations,
independent claim 1 was construed as covering at least all of those orientations. 61
For example, dependent claim 2 stated that the baffles may be “oriented with the
panel sections disposed at angles for deflecting projectiles.”62 Because claim 2
specified baffles oriented at non-right angles, the majority determined that claim 1
must be understood as including baffles oriented at both right and non-right angles.63
Otherwise, claim 2 would be redundant.64 Thus, the majority reversed the district
court’s summary judgment of noninfringement and remanded for further
proceedings.65
This critical portion of the majority opinion appears more Procedural than
Holistic because it treated the claim language as having significantly more weight
than the rest of the specification or the prosecution history. However, following this

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1582–83.
53 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).
54 Id. (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich,
C.J.)).
55 Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56 Id. at 1328.
57 Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58 Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
59 Phillips v. AWH Corp. 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing LiebelFlarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
60 Id. at 1324.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
65 Id. at 1328.
51
52
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portion of the opinion, the majority discussed the specification for several
paragraphs,66 diverging back to a Holistic approach.
Judge Alan D. Lourie, who joined Parts II and III, but dissented from Part IV,
criticized the majority for interpreting the claim as covering more than what the
inventor explained he had invented.67 In “simply point[ing] out that the specification
contains no disclosure of baffles at right angles,”68 Judge Lourie signaled his
preference for the Holistic approach, particularly one that resists expansion of the
claims beyond the limits of the disclosure. He would have affirmed the district
court’s summary judgment of noninfringement.69
Viewing Phillips in this fashion, it may be that the case did not favor the
Holistic approach over the Procedural approach at all. Instead, it may have simply
caused the approaches to become harder to distinguish. If so, this may help explain
why the two professors’ empirical research could not uncover an observable change in
the rates at which the Federal Circuit has applied the two approaches before and
after Phillips.
B. The Post-Phillips Debate
Since at least Phillips, Judge Lourie and now-Chief Judge Randall R. Rader
(who joined the Phillips majority in full) seem to have been debating the proper
approach to claim construction through their opinions. 70 Contrasting these opinions
suggests a way, post-Phillips, to distinguish the Federal Circuit’s divergent
approaches to claim construction. Also, contrasting these opinions indicates that the
two approaches often lead to interpretations that are substantially different in scope.
Judge Lourie has explained that “[t]he bottom line of claim construction should
be that the claims should not mean more than what the specification indicates, in one
way or another, the inventors invented.”71 He has written that a preferred way to
determine “what the inventors invented” includes reviewing the specification to glean
the extents of “what they disclosed.” 72 At least sometimes, this means what the
inventors explicitly disclosed.73
Consequently, Judge Lourie treats claim
differentiation as “not a hard and fast rule [that] will be overcome by a contrary
construction dictated by the written description or prosecution history.”74
Id. at 1325–27.
Id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1329–30 (Lourie, J. dissenting).
70 See Wegner, supra note 35.
71 Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Lourie, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 1257 (“In colloquial terms, ‘you should get what you disclose.’”).
73 See Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (noting that Judge Lourie’s opinion incorrectly ignored that the two
explicit recitations “of the invention” are examples); Arlington Indus., 632 F.3d at 1258 (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the accused infringer should not be prevented from doing what the
specification did not explicitly disclose, i.e., making an adapter without a split).
74 Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005); accord Arlington
Indus., 632 F.3d at 1258 (Lourie, J. dissenting) (“[C]laim differentiation should not enlarge claims
beyond what the specification tells us the inventors contemplated as their invention.”).
66
67
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Application of Judge Lourie’s technique sometimes includes a routine search of the
specification for what he often considers to be key phrases of limitation, such as “the
invention” or “the present invention.”75 If the specification states what “the
invention” or the “present invention” is, then under this approach, the patent is
considered to have described “what the inventor invented,” and this description may
be used to adjust the scope of the claims.76
On the other hand, according to Chief Judge Rader, “terms in a claim must be
given their ordinary meaning unless it is apparent that the inventor used them
differently in the patent.”77 Thus, he seems to require a more explicit statement of
limitation than does Judge Lourie before he will conclude that the specification limits
the claims. Where such a statement does not exist, the Chief Judge often uses claim
differentiation to determine the ordinary meaning of the claim terms. As noted
above, “[u]nder the doctrine of claim differentiation, ‘each claim in a patent is
presumptively different in scope.’”78 Recently, the Chief Judge explained that the
presumption created from differentiating claims is “especially strong when the
limitation in dispute is the only meaningful difference between an independent and
dependent claim.”79 Thus, claim differentiation may be used to broaden claim
constructions in order to capture concepts and embodiments not explicitly disclosed
in the specification.80
In 2011, Chief Judge Rader and Judge Lourie seemingly aired their debate in
Arlington Industries, Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,81 and Retractable Technologies,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.82 In Arlington Industries, the Chief Judge wrote the
majority opinion and Judge Lourie dissented.83 In Retractable Technologies, their
roles were reversed.84 Although the facts were different in the two cases, the
ostensible reason for the change was a different third judge on the two panels.
The patent in Arlington Industries related to fittings used to connect electrical
cables to junction boxes.85 The claimed fitting included a “spring metal adaptor.”86
The issue was whether this “spring metal adaptor” must be a “split” spring metal
adaptor that does not form a complete circle. 87 Applying claim differentiation to two
independent claims, Chief Judge Rader determined that the adaptor in one of the
claims need not be split.88 He explained that “[c]laim 1 recites a ‘spring metal
See Marine Polymer, 672 F.3d at 1359.
Id.
77 Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, C.J.,
dissenting).
78 Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
79 Retractable Techs. Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting SunRace Roots Enter. Co., Ltd. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
80 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (interpreting
the claim to include baffles at right angles even though “nowhere in the patent [wa]s there any
disclosure of a baffle projecting from the wall at a right angle”).
81 Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 632 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
82 Retractable Techs, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
83 See Arlington Indus., 632 F.3d at 1248, 1257.
84 See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1298, 1311.
85 See Arlington Indus., 632 F.3d at 1249–50.
86 Id. at 1249.
87 Id. at 1253.
88 Id. at 1254.
75
76
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adaptor being less than a complete circle,’ while claim 8 omits the less than a
complete circle modifier.”89 Therefore, he concluded that the term “adaptor” could
not include an implicit “split” limitation because an implicit “split” limitation would
render the explicit recitation of a split circle in claim 1 “superfluous.” 90 Thus, the
court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. 91
Judge Lourie dissented.92 He reviewed the specification and determined that
“the inventors made clear in the specification . . . that the spring metal adapters in
their invention have an opening that prevents the adaptors from forming a complete
circle.”93
Judge Lourie would have affirmed the summary judgment of
noninfringement because, otherwise, the appellee “might be held to be an infringer of
a patent that clearly indicates that there is a split in the adaptor, by making or
selling an adaptor lacking such a split.”94
In Retractable Technologies, the patents were directed to a syringe that
automatically retracts its needle after use.95 The claimed syringe included a “body.”96
The issue was whether this “body” could include more than one piece, or whether it
must be only a single piece.97 Judge Lourie determined that “body” should mean a
single piece body, explaining that the specification expressly recited that “the
invention” had a one-piece body.98 Under this construction, the majority found that
the accused two-piece syringe did not infringe.99
The Chief Judge dissented.100 He explained that differentiating the claims with
respect to the term “body” created an “especially strong” presumption that a “body”
could include more than one piece.101 For example, because claim 1 included a “body”
and claim 14 “claim[ed] ‘[t]he syringe of claim 1 comprising a one-piece barrel,’”102 the
Chief Judge concluded that the “body” of claim 1 must cover “bodies” having more
than one piece.103 Otherwise, the Chief Judge reasoned, claim 14 would be
nullified.104 Under this construction, the accused two-piece syringe would have
infringed.105
Retractable Technologies and Arlington Industries, together, indicate two
distinct approaches that arguably fall under Professor Polk’s and Professor Wagner’s
Procedural and Holistic umbrellas. And, following the recent case of Marine Polymer

Id.
Id. at 1254–55.
91 Id. at 1256.
92 Id. at 1257 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1258.
94 Id.
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102 Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 7,351,224 col. 19 l. 47 (filed July 17, 2000)).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1313.
89
90

[12:309 2013]
On Measuring the Expertise of Patent-Pilot Judges:
Encouraging Enhancement of Claim-Construction Uniformity

319

Technologies, Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., it appears that the Federal Circuit judges are
evenly divided over which approach is preferred. 106
In Marine Polymer, the issue was whether a claimed “biocompatible” substance
could exhibit some amount of biological reactivity or whether it could not exhibit any
biological reactivity.107 Independent claim 6, for example, did not specify what was
meant by biocompatible.108 However, three dependent claims did—they differed from
independent claim 6 only by specifying the amount of biological reactivity permitted
under a certain kind of test.109 Specifically, claim 12 required that the material
exhibit no biological reactivity, claim 13 allowed slight biological reactivity, and claim
14 allowed mild biological reactivity.110 After reviewing the record, the district judge
determined that the “biocompatible” substance could not exhibit any biological
reactivity.111
On appeal, an equally divided en banc panel could not agree whether this
construction was correct.112 The judges who agreed with the district judge found a
description of “the invention” in the specification, which indicated to them that there
could be “no biological reactivity.” 113 The other half of the judges relied on claim
differentiation to find that “[i]f ‘biocompatible’ requires that there be no reactivity,
but these dependent claims require slight or mild reactivity, they are nullified and
become utterly meaningless.”114
Unsurprisingly, Judge Lourie wrote the present-invention opinion.115
Surprisingly, Chief Judge Rader joined that opinion. 116 Whatever his reason, the
Chief Judge must have identified some factor strong enough to override what should
have been—at least according to his opinion in Retractable Technologies—an
“especially strong” presumption117 that the “biocompatible” substance could exhibit
some biological reactivity. And, whatever this reason, it was not strong enough to
overcome the “especially strong” presumption for the other half of the judges.
Phillips, Arlington Industries, Retractable Technologies, and Marine Polymer
each demonstrate that the meaning of a claim term depends heavily on which of the
two techniques is used. And, because claim construction is often dispositive, it
follows that the choice of approach may also be dispositive. 118 Although both
techniques have merit,119 at least one commentator has noted that “[n]o matter which
side is correct . . . , the more important point is that the debate should be . . . settled,

Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 1355–56.
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110 See U.S. Patent No. 6,864,245 col. 72 ll. 33–41 (filed July 11, 2003).
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112 Id. at 1372.
113 Id. at 1358.
114 Id. at 1368 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 1354.
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117 See supra note 79.
118 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
119 See Jason Rantanen, Arlington Industries v. Bridgeport Fittings: “The Specification is the
Heart of the Patent,” PATENTLY-O (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/
arlington-industries-v-bridgeport-fittings-the-specification-is-the-heart-of-the-patent.html.
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one way or the other, for the sake of providing the trial courts a clear scheme for
patent claim construction.”120
IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REVERSAL RATES MAY ERRONEOUSLY INDICATE SUCCESS
Until the debate is settled, the Pilot Program may not help district judges lower
their claim-construction reversal rates.121 In any given patent case, parties typically
dispute the meaning of certain claim terms, seeking definitions that will be helpful to
their infringement and invalidity positions. 122 In other words, for each disputed
term, one party argues for a definition that is broad in scope, and the other party
argues for a definition that is narrow in scope. A district judge must determine the
meaning and scope of these disputed terms under the spectre of the Federal Circuit’s
two divergent methodologies. On appeal, using Marine Polymer as an indicator, it
appears that the Federal Circuit may apply the same approach as the district judge
about half of the time.
Because choice of approach is largely outcome
determinative,123 the rate of reversal may be correspondingly high—an observation
that various empirical studies tend to support. 124 This result likely depends more on
the judges who hear the appeal than on the district judge’s experience.
Viewed in this light, the dual-framework divide at the Federal Circuit may
impart a systematic error into the Pilot Program experiment. Insofar as one of the
two frameworks may be regarded as being “incorrect,” this framework can be
considered a source of bias that leads to erroneous reversals and affirmances.125
Thus, in the current dual-framework regime, claim-construction reversals may be an
imprecise measure of claim-construction quality, and any correlation between these
reversals and judicial experience may also lack pragmatic significance. Worse, if
increased judicial expertise with patent law were to actually result in improved
claim-construction quality, it would likely be difficult to reliably conclude this result
from the reversal rate.
Recently, the Supreme Court passed over an opportunity to resolve the debate
when it denied a petition for certiorari in Retractable Technologies.126 Still, future
opportunities for the Supreme Court to weigh in may arise. 127 For example, Marine
Polymer, which remains mired at the Federal Circuit, stayed by a bankruptcy
120 Wegner, supra note 35; accord Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, (manuscript at 30).
Professors Polk and Wagner put a finer point on it: “[T]hese problems, although real, pale in
comparison to the damage wrought by the pervasive uncertainty, perverse incentives, and
technological amateurishness created by . . . Phillips.” Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7,
(manuscript at 30).
121 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
122 See Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 203,
205 (2012).
123 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
125 See Schwartz, Courting Specialization, supra note 6, at 1731–32.
126 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2013) (No. 11-1154).
127 See Ryan Davis, Top Court’s Denial Won’t Be Last Word on Claim Construction, LAW360
(Jan. 7, 2013, 7:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/405077?nl_pk=237395db-b119-4061-bf20e44144ac10b9&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip.
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petition, may become one opportunity.128 If the Supreme Court were to grant
certiorari in such a case and choose one of the Federal Circuit’s two approaches, it
could help increase the likelihood that the Pilot Program will be a success.
CONCLUSION
For the Pilot Program to be successful according to its own measures, district
judges must decrease their reversal rates, particularly for their claim constructions.
Currently, however, it appears that claim-construction reversal rates may be an
erroneous indicator of success because a district judge cannot know which of the
Federal Circuit’s two claim-construction frameworks will be applied on appeal.
Because a uniform approach to claim construction is better than a claim-game of
chance, the Supreme Court could grant a writ of certiorari in a future case, such as,
perhaps, Marine Polymer, and choose a single framework.
Under a single
framework, the claim-construction reversal rate may become a meaningful indicator
of the Pilot Program’s success.

128 See Letter to All Counsel Regarding Bankruptcy Petition and Staying of Case, Marine
Polymer v. Hemcon, No. 2010-1548 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2012), ECF No. 105; Defendant-Appellant
Hemcon, Inc.’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1 & n.1, Marine Polymer v. Hemcon, No. 20101548 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 16, 2012), ECF No. 99 (noting that “it is unusual to request rehearing of an en
banc decision,” but that the request was filed “out of an overabundance of caution” in light of the
bankruptcy stay); Erik Siemers, HemCon Tests Patent Law, PORTLAND BUS. J. (Apr. 27, 2012, 3:00
AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/print-edition/2012/04/27/hemcon-tests-patent-law.html?
page=3.

